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CALIBRATING PARTICIPATION: REFLECTIONS ON
PROCEDURE VERSUS PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch*
INTRODUCTION
Procedure plays a pivotal role in our justice system—it impacts how
and whether substantive rights are enforced and whether citizens view
courts as legitimate institutions.  Unfair procedures have been labeled
“the single most important source of popular dissatisfaction with the
American legal system.”1  And empirical studies demonstrate that
whether people are satisfied with the process and perceive it as being
procedurally fair significantly impacts their opinions of whether courts
are legitimate sources of power and authority, often even more so
than whether they win or lose.2  Nevertheless, whether it’s because of
these qualities or in spite of them, procedure is a prime target for stra-
tegic gamesmanship.
In most government branches, corporations easily have the upper
hand.  The average American cannot demand an audience with the
President or lobby Congress with any real hope.  But she can sue in
hopes of bringing corporate wrongdoing to justice3—or so goes the
* Charles H. Kirbo Chair of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.  My sincere thanks to
Stephan Landsman and the participants at the 21st Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and
Social Policy: The Supreme Court, Business and Civil Justice for their comments on an earlier
draft.
1. Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping
Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 517 (2003) (quoting Austin Sarat, Study-
ing American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey Evidence, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 427, 434
(1977)).
2. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, R-3708-ICJ, THE PERCEPTION OF
JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS’ VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION AND JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES, v, 50–53, 51 tbl.4.1 (1989). (“Although winners were more satisfied
with their experiences than losers, the litigants’ satisfaction with their experiences had less to do
with actual case outcomes, costs, and delay than with how the litigants’ experiences with the
system compared with their expectations.”); Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in
Defendants’ Evaluations of Their Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51, 69–70
(1984); Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH
IN LAW 65, 68 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001) (“While lawyers and judges often
think that people’s reactions to their experiences are driven by whether or not they ‘win’ their
case, that position is not supported by empirical research on disputing.”).
3. As Arthur Miller writes:
323
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traditional telling of the litigation story.4  Painting the plaintiff as the
prima donna, she gets to decide who to sue, what claims to bring, and
where to file suit.  The defendant, by contrast, is stuck with a few reac-
tive tools: counterclaims, impleader, removal, and transfer.  That is,
unless the plaintiff signed a contract with an arbitration or forum se-
lection clause, or the defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction
in her state, or the only way to gain the information necessary to plau-
sibly plead her claim is through discovery, or her case is transferred or
swept up in multidistrict litigation.  Slowly, her litigation control and
participation opportunities begin to wane in the only governmental
branch available to her.
So begins the alternative version of the litigation story.  Like the
wolf’s retelling of the Three Little Pigs in which “[t]he real story is
about a sneeze and a cup of sugar[,]”5 the corporate account depicts
plaintiffs running amok with frivolous claims.  Nationwide corpora-
tions faced a slew of injustices:  worthless lawsuits, liability rules that
leaned too heavily in plaintiffs’ favor, biased local juries, runaway ju-
ries awarding jackpot-level punitive damages, drive-through class cer-
tification in state courts, and class actions that blackmailed
corporations into settling.6  Innovation and creativity suffered, market
The efforts of public interest attorneys go well beyond the classic civil rights and
legislative reapportionment battles.  Asbestos is held in check by the private bar.  To-
bacco is cabined by the private bar.  Defective pharmaceuticals such as diet drugs, Vi-
oxx, and other products are removed from our midst.  Illicit financial and market
practices of companies such as Enron are halted by the private bar. . . .  Fewer Ameri-
cans die or become incapacitated by defective products or toxic substances, and impor-
tant social and economic policies are enforced because of the work of these lawyers.
Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Re-
flections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 299–300 (2013) (foot-
notes omitted).
4. As Tom Tyler has explained: “[T]he judiciary fares reasonably well in contrast to the other
branches of government [in terms of trust].  The proportion of Americans expressing a similar
level of trust in the judiciary was 75% in 2003.  However, even the courts have lost legitimacy in
recent years.” Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Aggregation: Promise and Potential Pitfalls, 64
DEPAUL L. REV. 711, 721 (2015).
5. JON SCIESZKA, THE TRUE STORY OF THE 3 LITTLE PIGS 4 (1989).
6. Marc Galanter might label this the “jaundiced view.”  Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell:
Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 717–21 (1998)
(“The legal system can be restored to sanity only by ‘reform.’  The needed reforms, it turns out,
make it more difficult for individual claimants to use the system to challenge corporate entities,
reduce levels of accountability, place ceilings on remedy, and in some cases move organizational
disputes with workers, customers, and patients from public forums into ‘alternative’ forums
sponsored by the corporation itself.”); see also Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narra-
tive in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1090 (2012) (dub-
bing this part of the “cost-and-delay narrative”).
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forces were hamstrung,7 and something had to be done.  Civil justice
or “tort reform” followed apace and the rhetoric began.8  When re-
form faltered substantively at the federal level, it trickled into the
states’ laws and manifested in federal civil procedure despite, as Marc
Galanter put it, “a now-formidable mass of empirical data that shows
that so many of its key assertions are at best exaggerated and in many
cases entirely mistaken[.]”9
This tug-of-war is important to contextualize a seemingly narrow
procedural point about plaintiffs’ ability to meaningfully participate in
litigating their rights, particularly when the same defendant harms
many people in similar ways.  Now it is the rare plaintiff who sues a
nationwide (or worldwide) corporation in her home jurisdiction and
can litigate and resolve her claims there.  Although several factors
play a role in this phenomenon (including tort reform efforts like the
Class Action Fairness Act10), one of the most significant factors is Su-
preme Court jurisprudence over the last ten years in the areas of arbi-
tration,11 personal jurisdiction,12 pleading,13 and class actions.14  Of
course, recent cases aren’t the first evidence of a shift away from pro-
cedural justice norms.  Commentators have long lamented the “van-
ishing trial” and the rise of summary judgment,15 often citing those
7. E.g., VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVE-
NESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA 6 (1991); Deborah R. Hensler, Taking
Aim at the American Legal System: The Council on Competitiveness’s Agenda for Legal Reform,
75 JUDICATURE 244, 245–48 (1992).
8. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 6, at 734–37 (debunking the pervasive myth that America has R
70% of the world’s lawyers); Miller, supra note 3, at 332 (“Politicians and special interests, R
sometimes aided, perhaps ‘innocently,’ by the media, vilify the plaintiffs’ bar as fee-hawking
ambulance chasers.  Americans have been defamed as fortune hunters trying to win the litigation
lottery.  Bogus caseload statics are propagated, while empirical data is ignored . . . .” (footnote
omitted)); AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., http://www.judicialhellholes.org (last visited Oct. 5,
2015) (publishing annual reports of abuses in the judicial system and “focusing primarily on
jurisdictions where courts have been radically out of balance”).
9. Galanter, supra note 6, at 722. See generally Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The R
Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 7 DENV. U. L. REV. 77, 77–91 (1993) (exposing the inaccurate
statistics used to portray this view).
10. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
11. E.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
12. E.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
13. E.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
14. E.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013); Comcast
Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
15. See, e.g., Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Where Have You Gone, Spot Mozingo? A Trial Judge’s
Lament over the Demise of the Civil Jury Trial, 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 99, 101 (2010); Marc Ga-
lanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State
Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL & LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004); Patricia Lee Refo, The Vanishing Trial,
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trends as evidence of “[m]erit-phobia,” “death by a thousand proce-
dural cuts,” and a general demolition of both democratic tradition and
the civil justice system’s credibility.16
At the heart of these concerns lies a persistent theme: the need for
citizen access to, and participation in, convenient dispute resolution.
Other scholars writing about arbitration,17 closing the courthouse
doors,18 and the democratizing function of trials19 have already tack-
led many facets of this theme.  Accordingly, this Article hones in on a
slightly different aspect: securing and curtailing participation rights
through both aggregating and pleading.  What participation rights the
Supreme Court secures by protecting individuals’ rights against virtual
representation and preclusion, it takes away by imposing heightened
pleading standards.  Pleading is participating; it’s the crucial first step.
Closing the courthouse doors when defendants hold the information
plaintiffs need to plausibly plead their claims forecloses all manner of
justice—not just procedural justice.
Part II begins by explaining why voice matters and how, after many
commentators interpreted Mathews v. Eldridge20 as adopting a purely
instrumental view of participation, the Court’s more recent decisions
in Taylor v. Sturgell21 and Smith v. Bayer Corp.22 regard participation
and its corresponding “day-in-court” ideal as doing more than just en-
suring accurate outcomes.23  Those opinions take significant measures
to protect nonparties’ participation rights against the gradual creep of
both preclusion doctrines and aggregate litigation.  By striking down
efforts to extinguish nonparties’ day in court through virtual represen-
tation and proposed but never certified class actions, the Court has
shifted toward the dignitary view of participation:  allowing some sub-
sequent cases to proceed improves the outcome’s accuracy no more
than any “do-over” would.  Viewed solely in that light, the rationale is
LITIGATION, Winter 2004, at 1, 4; William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanish-
ing Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 73 (2006).
16. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 3, at 307–09. R
17. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access
to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703 (2012).
18. See, e.g., Judith Resnik & Dennis Curtis, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTRO-
VERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors: October Term 2010, 14 GREEN BAG 2d 375 (2011),
http://www.greenbag.org/v14n4/v14n4_articles_chemerinsky.pdf; Judith Resnik, Fairness in
Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125
HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011).
19. See supra note 15 (citing sources discussing vanishing trials). R
20. 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976).
21. 553 U.S. 880 (2008).
22. 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011).
23. See infra notes 32–68 and accompanying text.
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nonsensical because it undercuts the entire premise behind preclusion
doctrines.  Rather, the Court recognized that participation does more
than simply increase accuracy—it promotes litigants’ dignitary inter-
ests and ensures the outcome’s legitimacy.24
Still, protecting nonparties’ right to participate provides lower
courts with no guidance on how litigants might exercise that right
within aggregate litigation.  In aggregate litigation, a claimant is one of
many (or an absent class member), attorney-client relationships are
attenuated at best, inclusion within the group may be mandatory, and
claimants may not even know about the action until a settlement has
been proposed.  Intuitively, the context must matter: when claims are
personal to the holder, like personal injury claims, disputants are
more likely to feel slighted by inadequate participation than they are
in small-claims class actions over a few dollars.  But a claim’s personal
nature fails to explain the lack of participation in some mandatory
class actions.  For example, absent class members in school desegrega-
tion litigation held strong and conflicting views about bussing their
children to poor but integrated schools.25  Nevertheless, as a Rule
23(b)(2) class, the parties did not have to notify affected parents until
after they proposed a settlement.  And had the case been fully liti-
gated, not settled, no notice whatsoever would have been required.
Accordingly, Part III.A builds a framework for considering partici-
pation rights in aggregate litigation based on underlying substantive
rights, group dynamics, and empirical studies on procedural justice.
Classifying the underlying substantive rights at stake along a spectrum
that ranges from individually held rights with divisible remedies to
group rights requiring indivisible remedies may help predict participa-
tion expectations as well as explain the pragmatic results.  For in-
stance, individuals litigating their own personal injury claims are likely
to have strong day-in-court expectations (i.e., they will be able to pre-
sent the specific facts of their case to the judge without others interfer-
ing).  At the other end of the spectrum, for example, when a state sues
another state to secure water rights for its citizens, citizens might voice
24. In this sense, the Court extended its core rationale in Martin v. Wilks that “one is not
bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to
which he has not been made a party by service of process.” See 490 U.S. at 761 (quoting Han-
sberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)).
25. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1976); Leo Crowley, Note, Due Process Rights
of Absentees in Title VII Class Actions—The Myth of Homogeneity of Interest, 59 B.U. L. REV.
661, 666–80 (1979) (arguing that the divergent interests in Title VII cases cause inadequate
representation).
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their concerns in town hall meetings, but it’s unlikely that they’d ex-
pect the court to entertain their grievances directly.
Moving away from those two poles toward the middle of the spec-
trum, when a group is highly cohesive, as it might be when aggregate
rights are concerned, members may feel comfortable participating
through a representative.  In organized groups such as unions, oppor-
tunities to participate and dissent within group governance might sat-
isfy members’ participation needs such that they can speak with one
voice in court.  The practical can align with the personal:  group rights
require a group remedy that inures to all or to none equally.  Thinking
of voice in this way reflects procedure’s fundamentally interpersonal
nature in governing and mediating citizens’ interactions with one an-
other and the courts, but it also aligns with research on group engage-
ment.  Put simply, group identity can play a primary role in shaping
members’ participation expectations.
As the school desegregation cases illustrate, there are some stum-
bling blocks to ensuring adequate participation in any kind of
mandatory class action or involuntary joinder.  Substantive rights and
day-in-court expectations do not always neatly divide into aggregate
or individual rights or all-or-nothing participation, as a spectrum sug-
gests.  The middle of the spectrum often proves the most challenging.
Group members may be only loosely affiliated even when litigating
aggregate rights that demand a single remedy.  Thus, they may have
vastly conflicting opinions about legal theories, presenting evidence,
and shaping the aggregate remedial relief, yet receive no notice until
parties propose a settlement.26  Accordingly, Part III.B suggests
means for improving voice in mandatory actions by notifying mem-
bers upon certification, not just settlement.
Finally, Part IV returns to recent Supreme Court cases to expose a
fundamental inconsistency in the Court’s day-in-court jurisprudence.
Although Part II describes the Court as taking exemplary measures to
shield individuals’ participation rights from the steady drum beat of
efficiency—protecting them against the swell of virtual representation
and uncertified classes—the Court then faltered in deciding pleading
cases.  The majority in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly27 and Ashcroft
v. Iqbal28 failed to connect pleading with participating.  The complaint
is a plaintiff’s first opportunity to voice her concerns to the court, to
26. Rule 23(c)(2) allows, but does not require, notice in mandatory actions, although the
“court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound” by
a proposed settlement under Rule 23(e)(1). FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
27. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
28. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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state a claim that entitles her to relief, and to open the courthouse
doors.  Curtailing that chance by requiring plaintiffs to state facts, the
most plausible interpretation of which entitles them to relief, fore-
closes further participation opportunities when the defendant pos-
sesses that information.  Consequently, Part IV investigates the cost-
and-delay myth that corporations and the Court cite to justify plausi-
bility pleading in Twombly and Iqbal.  After determining that those
concerns lack empirical support and that the Court undermined dem-
ocratic rulemaking procedures by instituting heightened pleading
standards, one is left to wonder whether the last branch of govern-
ment truly remains open to the public.  After all, guaranteeing an indi-
vidual’s right to her day in court is a right often devoid of meaning if it
applies only to plaintiffs who already possess the necessary facts.
Of course, state courts are still open.  One possible fallout is that
plaintiffs who can avoid federal jurisdiction will seek respite in those
state courts that have not inhibited participation via pleading.29  And
most litigation takes place in state court anyway.  So, whether we
should be concerned about recent Supreme Court decisions plays into
the longstanding debate over whether parity exists between federal
and state courts.30  As the recent clash over gay marriage rights in
Alabama illustrates, the parity debate rages on with important sub-
stantive rights hanging in the balance.31  Nevertheless, this Article
neither attempts to resolve that debate nor claims that procedural jus-
tice is the only thing disputants care about.  Instead, it links participa-
tion to courts’ legitimacy, provides a framework to help judges
29. A 2010 report noted that twenty-four states adopted tighter pleading standards with
twenty-seven maintaining traditional notice pleading.  A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading in State
Courts After Twombly and Iqbal, in POUND CIVIL JUSTICE INST., 2010 BACK TO THE FUTURE:
PLEADING AGAIN IN THE AGE OF DICKENS? 2 (2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/
SSRN_ID2038349_code392707.pdf?abstractid=2038349&mirid=1.
30. E.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1991); Burt
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (arguing that parity is a myth and
that constitutional litigators prefer federal courts); Burt Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in
Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (1981); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity,
Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional
Rights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329 (1988).
31. A federal judge legalized same-sex marriage, but Roy Moore, the Alabama Supreme
Court Chief Justice, ordered judges not to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.  Alan
Blinder & Richard Pe´rez-Pen˜a, Gay Marriage in Alabama Begins, But Only in Parts, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2015, at A1.  As Burt Neuborne recognized, procedural parity is an important
factor.  He defined this term as:
[T]he better forum as the one more likely to assign a very high value to the protection
of the individual, even the unreasonable or dangerous individual, against the collective,
so that the definition of the individual right in question will receive its most expansive
reading and its most energetic enforcement.
Neuborne, supra note 30, at 727. R
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understand litigants’ varying voice expectations in aggregate litigation,
and registers alarm over limiting court access through plausibility
pleading.
II. PROTECTING NONPARTIES’ PARTICIPATION IDEALS
It may seem odd, but people are often more concerned with just
procedures than fair outcomes.32  To be sure, outcomes matter, but
fair treatment by the decision maker matters, too.  Because demo-
cratic systems like ours take citizen preferences into account when de-
signing process, procedure impacts the judiciary’s institutional
legitimacy.33  Institutional legitimacy is critical for obvious reasons:
not everyone can have everything they want, so society must be will-
ing to accept judicial decisions, win or lose.34  And study after study
shows that disputants are more willing to accept and voluntarily com-
ply with decisions that are reached fairly.35
Over the years, scholars have described procedural justice compo-
nents in various ways.36  Tom Tyler, one of the most influential schol-
ars in this field, has identified four “primary factors” that contribute
to procedural fairness, including “opportunities for participation
(voice), the neutrality of the forum, the trustworthiness of the authori-
ties, and the degree to which people receive treatment with dignity
and respect.”37  Even though our system is designed with these princi-
ples in mind,38 procedures can drift away from their procedural justice
moorings.
Take forum shopping, for example.  When people litigate against
those outside their social group—say individuals versus large corpora-
tions—they are particularly concerned with gaining an upper hand via
32. Tyler & Lind, supra note 2, at 71; Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected R
Mediation: What’s Justice Got To Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 818, 818 n.150 (2001)
(citing E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
66–70, 205 (1988)).
33. LIND & TYLER supra note 32, at 63–64. R
34. Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCH. 117, 118 (2000).
“The willingness to defer to social rules flows from judgments that authorities are legitimate and
ought to be obeyed.” Id. at 120.
35. Id. at 119 (citing numerous studies).
36. For instance, in 1980, Gerald Leventhal proposed that people use six criteria when evalu-
ating procedural fairness: (1) whether all interested parties’ views were represented; (2) the deci-
sion maker’s consistency in applying substantive laws and legal rules; (3) the use of nonbiased
decision makers; (4) whether the decision was based on accurate information; (5) whether there
were error correction mechanisms; and (6) whether those involved in decision making acted
ethically. LIND & TYLER, supra note 32, at 107. R
37. Tyler, supra note 34, at 121. R
38. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts,
63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 149 (2011).
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process and forum selection.39  And social-identity theorists have em-
pirically shown that people respond more positively to authority
figures when they believe that those figures share common moral val-
ues.40  But arbitration and multidistrict litigation alter forum selection
in ways that may move plaintiffs away from their preferred geographic
location (making participation difficult) and change the decision
maker to someone who may not share the plaintiff’s values, experi-
ence, or community norms.41  So, while public support for courts
hinges on the notion that authorities share common moral values with
the communities they serve,42 transfer and arbitration can undermine
that support, particularly if claimants perceive the new authority as
biased.43
In some respects then, procedural justice can lead to a zero-sum
analysis: increasing control and participation for plaintiffs by allowing
them to remain in their chosen fora might decrease defendants’ justice
perceptions.  Yet, this need not always be the case.  Even forum selec-
tion is filled with compromises: plaintiffs choose state court, a defen-
dant removes to federal court, but that court is often not located so far
away that plaintiffs can’t participate or that the judge becomes atypi-
cal.  Likewise, providing plaintiffs with increased participation rights
need not detract from defendants’ voice opportunities.44  But aggre-
gating plaintiffs can impact their voice, too.  And allowing thousands
of individuals to control their own cases would undermine the very
purpose of joinder—to increase efficiency and consistency.
Before tackling the aggregation-versus-voice conundrum, it is help-
ful to understand what procedural justice theorists mean by participa-
39. Tyler, supra note 34, at 123. R
40. “When people think that group authorities represent their values, they identify and coop-
erate with them.” Jason Sunshine & Tom Tyler, Moral Solidarity, Identification with the Commu-
nity and the Importance of Procedural Justice: The Police as Prototypical Representatives of a
Group’s Moral Values, 66 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 153, 162 (2003).
41. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 686 (2013).
42. Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 40, at 154. R
43. See LIND ET AL., supra note 2, at 65–66; TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 117 R
(1990) (citing Robert Folger, A Referent Cognitions Theory of Relative Deprivation, in 4 RELA-
TIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL COMPARISON 33 (James M. Olson et al. eds., 1986) and Robert
Folger, Rethinking Equity Theory: A Referent Cognitions Model, in JUSTICE IN SOCIAL RELA-
TIONS 145 (Hans Werner Bierhoff et al. eds., 1986)); E. Allan Lind & Robin I. Lissak, Apparent
Impropriety and Procedural Fairness Judgments, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 19, 26–27
(1985); R.A. Macdonald, A Theory of Procedural Fairness, 1 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 3, 19
(1981); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Value of
Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 482–91 (1986).
44. Nevertheless, there is evidence supporting the notion that defendants are winning the pro-
cedure battle.  And because procedure is often comparative, when people judge their circum-
stances vis-a`-vis others, the relative deprivation theory suggests that recalibration may be in
order.  Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 38, at 150 n.125. R
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tion.  Participating allows litigants to feel some control over their
cases by presenting evidence and stating their case.45  This includes
basic due process rights like ensuring that those who are bound by a
decision have the opportunity to take part (and be heard) in adjudica-
tion, but it also includes observing the proceedings, cross-examining
witnesses, and hearing the judge’s decision.46  Nevertheless, social psy-
chologists, philosophers, and even legal scholars have set forth at least
two theories as to why participation matters.47
First, the instrumental view posits that participation is valuable be-
cause voice influences the case’s outcome (decisional control or out-
come control).48  By this thinking, participation is necessary to
produce substantively accurate outcomes and diminish error.49  Partic-
ipation might thus be curtailed when it fails to enhance accuracy, as it
might in some class actions.  If the class representative is truly ade-
quate and typical, adding more voices may not enhance the outcome,
so voice could be marginalized.  Conversely, participation could im-
45. LIND ET AL., supra note 2, at 61; TYLER, supra note 43, at 116 (citing Tom Tyler, et al., R
Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders: Exploring the Meaning of Process Control, 48 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72 (1985)); see John Thibault & Laurens Walker, A Theory of
Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541, 546–47, 558 (1978).
46. MICHAEL D. BAYLES, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: ALLOCATING TO INDIVIDUALS 40 (1990)
(“The common-law principle of an opportunity to be heard has typically been taken to include
rights (1) to adequate notice, (2) to pre-hearing discovery, (3) to an adjournment, (4) to present
evidence, (5) to rebut evidence and often to cross-examine adverse witnesses, (6) to a copy of
the transcript, and (8) [sic] to reasons for a decision.” (citing GEOFFREY A. FLICK, NATURAL
JUSTICE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICAL APPLICATION 69 (1984) and Roderick A. Macdonald, Pro-
cedural Due Process in Canadian Constitutional Law: Natural Justice and Fundamental Justice,
39 FLA. L. REV. 217, 237 n.36 (1987))); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L.
REV. 181, 280 (2004); see Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 759–62 (1989), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 251 (1994); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (contending
that “the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking
process” is a central feature of the Due Process Clause). See generally Robert G. Bone, Rethink-
ing the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 269 (1992) (argu-
ing that the extent of a nonparty’s right to relitigate claims or issues should vary with the type of
case).
47. Procedural due process scholarship divides along similar lines.  Martin H. Redish & Wil-
liam J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell, Procedural Due Process, and the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving
the Virtual Representation Dilemma, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877, 1889 (2009) (discussing the
two camps).
48. TYLER, supra note 43, at 116; E. Allen Lind et al., Voice, Control & Procedural Justice, 59 R
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952 (1990).
49. Robert Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1011, 1015–16 (2010); see
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (providing a balancing test that has typically been used
to protect systemic accuracy, not noninstrumental values). But see Jerry L. Mashaw, The Su-
preme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge:
Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 48 (1976) (criticizing Ma-
thews as too narrow).
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prove accuracy in settlement class actions.  In settlement classes, the
power balance tips in defendants’ favor by allowing them to “[seek]
closure on the cheap by taking advantage of the absence of class mem-
bers and the weak bargaining position of would-be class counsel.”50
Consequently, allowing class members to intervene routinely to pro-
tect their rights might improve the outcome’s accuracy when the ad-
versarial process breaks down.51
Second, the noninstrumental perspective suggests that participation
is important for reasons beyond buttressing accuracy; process control
is independently valuable because people appreciate being able to
state their position to a decision maker.52  In this sense, participating
enhances dignity and legitimacy regardless of whether it improves the
outcome’s accuracy.53  Recent studies have embraced this view and
posited that people value the chance to explain their side regardless of
whether their story ultimately influences the third party’s decision.54
Although these two different views are not mutually exclusive, they
do have important implications for large-scale litigation when partici-
pation opportunities are slim.
After the Supreme Court decided Mathews v. Eldridge in 1976,
many commentators read the Court’s multi-factor balancing test as
protecting only systemic accuracy—the instrumental view.55  The test
itself seemingly accommodates both instrumental and noninstru-
mental concerns: it benignly asks courts to balance private interests
and the risk that those interests will be erroneously deprived against
the public or governmental interest.56  Nevertheless, many commenta-
50. Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
951, 953 (2014).
51. “Affording class members such a right of intervention will not render class litigation un-
manageable, but rather has the potential to significantly improve the quality of representation
afforded even to absent class members.”  Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate
Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571, 573 (1997).
52. TYLER, supra note 43, at 116; Lind et al., supra note 48, at 952. R
53. See Redish & Katt, supra note 47, at 1890. R
54. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 162 (1985)
(discussing the findings of Thibaut and Walker in their study of whether “adversarial” or “inquis-
itorial” trial procedure better serves the purposes of justice); TYLER, supra note 43, at 133; see R
also LIND & TYLER, supra note 32, at 96–97.
55. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 49, at 48 (“The [Matthews] Court conceives of the values of R
procedure too narrowly: it views the sole purpose of procedural protections as enhancing accu-
racy, and thus limits its calculus to the benefits or costs that flow from correct or incorrect deci-
sions.  No attention is paid to ‘process values’ that might inhere in oral proceedings or to the
demoralization costs that may result from the grant-withdrawal-grant-withdrawal sequence to
which claimants like Eldridge are subjected.”).
56. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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tors subsequently interpreted this test as aiming to improve accuracy
and minimize error, not to heed litigants’ dignitary concerns.57
More recent opinions, however, cater to noninstrumental concerns
by permitting repetitious litigation that arguably does little to improve
accuracy—at least not beyond the gains that anyone might expect
from a second chance.  In both Taylor v. Sturgell and Smith v. Bayer,
the Court might have reasoned that allowing a second plaintiff to reli-
tigate the same Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request or cer-
tify a similar class action after other courts had previously denied both
would do little to correct error or improve the outcome.  And reliti-
gating those requests would do nothing to further efficiency or consis-
tency.  But the Court permitted subsequent litigation to proceed in
both cases.
In Taylor, the Court gutted the virtual representation doctrine.  Vir-
tual representation precluded individuals from relitigating based on a
watered down version of adequate representation shorn of its class-
certification protections.58  The case involved two friends, both vin-
tage aircraft enthusiasts, who separately filed FOIA requests for old
F-45 airplane records.  Although the plaintiffs lacked any legal rela-
tionship, the appellate court held that Greg Herrick’s earlier suit pre-
cluded Brent Taylor’s later request for the same information because
Herrick was Taylor’s “virtual representative” and the two used the
same lawyer.59  When Taylor brought his case, he sought to litigate
two issues that Herrick failed to raise relating to the recapture of pro-
tected trade secret status.60  Thus, one might contend that instrumen-
tal concerns dictated the Court’s decision—allowing the second suit
would lead to a more accurate outcome.  But that rationale alone
would erode preclusion doctrines entirely; many losing litigants would
learn from their mistakes and could improve their outcome with a
“do-over.”61  The result makes more sense from a noninstrumental
perspective: Taylor did not have a “full and fair opportunity to liti-
gate[,]” and precluding him based on virtual representation would un-
57. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 49, at 48 (“[A]s the Court seeks to make sense of a calculus R
in which accuracy is the sole goal of procedure, it tends erroneously to characterize disability
hearings as concerned almost exclusively with medical impairment and thus concludes that such
hearings involve only medical evidence, whose reliability would be little enhanced by oral proce-
dure.”); Woolley, supra note 51, at 590–91 (“[The Mathews test] has usually been viewed solely R
as a means to ensure procedures whose accuracy is commensurate with the interests at stake.”).
58. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 885 (2008).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 887–88.
61. A plaintiff might, for example, seek to relitigate the same issues a second time by switch-
ing adversaries, a proposition that nonmutual, defensive issue preclusion prevents. See Blonder-
Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328 (1971) (discussing issue preclusion).
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dermine the “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have
[his or her] own day in court.”62
Similar concerns dictated the outcome in Bayer.63  In multidistrict
proceedings consolidated in Minnesota, Bayer successfully defeated a
motion to certify a class of West Virginia residents who purchased
Baycol.  When a West Virginia state court subsequently considered
whether to certify a similar class of West Virginia purchasers, Bayer
persuaded the Minnesota federal court to enjoin the state court from
hearing the motion.64  The company argued that the second proposed
class could not proceed because “an unnamed member of a proposed
but uncertified class” had already represented the second proposed
class.65  Citing the instrumental concern that there was no need to reli-
tigate whether to certify “the same class” alleging “the same legal the-
ories,” the Eighth Circuit agreed.66  But this was paradoxical: Bayer
wanted to bind the second proposed class representative to a class that
never existed.  As the Supreme Court made clear in reversing the
Eighth Circuit: “Neither a proposed class action nor a rejected class
action may bind nonparties.”67  Here again, one could cite instrumen-
tal concerns—West Virginia disavowed federal Rule 23’s predomi-
nance analysis and could thus decide to certify a class when the
federal court did not.  But the Court did not stop there.  It extended
Taylor’s core day-in-court rationale:  “To allow [the first suit] to bind
nonparties would be to adopt the very theory Taylor rejected.”68
III. PARTICIPATING IN AGGREGATE LITIGATION
In many respects, the Supreme Court has done an admirable job of
shielding litigants’ participation rights from involuntary collectiviza-
tion that lacks appropriate safeguards.  But participation—much less
control—is cursory, at best, in large-scale litigation.  Aggregate litiga-
tion, from class actions to mass joinder through multidistrict litigation,
trades participation and control for efficiency and consistency.  It also
adds new depth to a wrinkle that is inherent in many procedural jus-
tice studies: most studies are performed on parties, not their lawyers.
But lawyers’ own impressions can influence their clients’ perceptions,
and the way an attorney treats her clients—by spending time commu-
62. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892–93 (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)).
63. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2378 (2011).
64. Id. at 2374.
65. Id. at 2379.
66. Id. at 2374 (quoting In re Bayol Prods. Lit., 593 F.3d 716, 724 (8th Cir. 2010), vacated, No
09–1069, 2011 WL 11747958 (8th Cir. Aug. 4, 2011)).
67. Id. at 2380.
68. Id. at 2381.
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nicating with them and explaining the process, for example—can also
affect clients’ experiences with the justice system.69
Attorneys’ time, however, is scarce in aggregate litigation, which is
often a numbers game.  In class actions, class members are, by defini-
tion, absent, and the only communication that most receive comes
when the judge decides to certify the class or, more likely, the lawyers
have proposed a class settlement.  Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) do not
require parties to notify class members at all until they reach a settle-
ment even though class membership is mandatory.70  Thus, due pro-
cess and, to some extent, procedural justice seem to hinge on whether
the attorney and class representative adequately represented absent
members.
The attorney-client relationship is attenuated in multidistrict litiga-
tion too; plaintiffs retain their own attorney, but attorneys often re-
present hundreds of plaintiffs with nominally related claims.
Meaningfully communicating and fully informing each client becomes
more difficult pragmatically and logistically.71  Moreover, transferee
judges add a layer of bureaucracy by appointing steering committees.
Without a seat at this decision-making table, individual attorneys may
be unable to effectively voice their clients’ concerns, much less control
the litigation.72  Plus, because most cases settle while in multidistrict
litigation, plaintiffs have little to no opportunity for presenting indi-
69. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 38, at 147 (“Although there are not yet clear data R
demonstrating the effects of procedural justice assessments by lawyers on clients or of the rela-
tionship between specific lawyer behavior and client perceptions, a discussion of procedural jus-
tice in litigation would be incomplete without an acknowledgement that both of these
perceptions may be important, may differ from one another, and may also be dynamically inter-
related.”); Jonathan Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 483,
485 (1988) (suggesting that clients felt the process was, procedurally, more just based on the
amount of time they spent communicating with their attorney); William L.F. Felstiner & Ben
Pettit, Paternalism, Power, and Respect in Lawyer–Client Relations, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE
RESEARCH IN LAW, supra note 2, at 39 (suggesting the importance of lawyer-client experiences
to clients’ procedural justice perceptions); Nourit Zimerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to
Counsel and Access to Justice: A Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 473, 495
(2010) (noting that pro se litigants “felt they had a greater opportunity to speak” but those with
lawyers felt more in control).
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(C)(2), (E).
71. Some attorneys have eased this problem by embracing technology to widely disseminate
information.  See Robert Klonoff et al., Making Class Actions Work: The Untapped Potential of
the Internet, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 727 (2008); Jack B. Weinstein, The Democratization of Mass
Actions in the Internet Age, 45 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 451 (2012). This is not to say that
attorneys representing many clients in the same litigation do not comply with Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.4, but that the character of the relationship itself changes from a one-on-
one relationship to a less personal group setting.
72. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71,
73–75 (2015).
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vidual evidence or taking part in hearings.73  Plaintiffs can, however,
decide whether to settle.  Yet, some settlements include coercive
terms, such as those requiring participating attorneys to recommend
the deal to all of their clients and withdraw from representing clients
who refuse, that can negate genuine consent and control.74
A. Adjusting Voice To Reflect Underlying Rights
and Group Dynamics
As this thumbnail sketch of aggregate litigation illustrates, partici-
pation differs from bipolar litigation in many respects, even beyond
attenuated lawyer-client relationships.  Aggregate litigation can im-
pact absent class members, affect groups as a whole, and have quasi-
public components.  Accordingly, understanding participation re-
quires considering these unique circumstances alongside traditional
instrumental concerns about improving accuracy as well as noninstru-
mental concerns that participation enhances perceived fairness apart
from outcomes.
Intuitively, disputants are less likely to feel slighted by inadequate
voice opportunities in small claims litigation, such as being
overcharged by a dollar or two for an e-book,75 than in claims that are
personal to the holder, such as having to surgically replace a defective
hip implant.76  In this sense, procedural justice is context dependent; it
73. This is troubling; hearings are a crucial means to “provide injured parties with an opportu-
nity to express their feelings, state their arguments, present their evidence, describe their losses,
and talk about their grievances.”  Tyler, supra note 4, at 729.  See Alexandra D. Lahav, Participa- R
tion and Procedure, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 513, 524-27 (2015) for the rationales in favor of in-
creased dialogue in this context to facilitate participation.
74. E.g., Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc. and the Counsel Listed on the
Signature Pages Hereto at 5–6, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. La.
Nov. 9, 2007) (No. 1657), http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/Master%20Settle
ment%20Agreement%20-%20new.pdf.  See Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 279–92 (2011), for the many ways in which
this agreement arguably ran afoul of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
75. For example, Apple was sued for price fixing its electronic books.  Bob Van Voris, Apple
E-Books Litigation Is Set To Get Resolved for $450 Million, CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA)
(Nov. 21, 2014), http://news.bna.com/clsn/CLSNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=59380512&vname=
clasnotallissues&wsn=504174000&searchid=26105957&doctypeid=1&type=date&mode=doc&
split=0&scm=CLSNWB&pg=0.
76. In 2010, Johnson & Johnson and DePuy recalled 93,000 hip implants, leading to lawsuits
claiming that the recalled devices were defective and caused metal poisoning in patients.  Jef
Feeley, J&J To Pay as Much as $420 Million More To Resolve Additional ASR Hip Implant
Suits, CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) (Feb. 23, 2015), http://news.bna.com/clsn/CLSNWB/
split_display.adp?fedfid=63780035&vname=clasnotallissues&wsn=503096000&searchid=261059
62&doctypeid=1&type=date&mode=doc&split=0&scm=CLSNWB&pg=0.
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varies based on litigants’ claims and expectations.77  But this notion
that participation rights should fluctuate depending on whether a law-
suit is personal to the holder fails to fully explain the lack of voice
opportunities in multidistrict litigation and mandatory classes.  For in-
stance, courts often certified school desegregation and bussing cases
as mandatory 23(b)(2) classes that required no notice until settlement
despite clear evidence of strongly held and conflicting opinions as to
the remedy: some class members preferred to improve local African-
American schools instead of integrating, while others wanted to avoid
bussing their children to integrated but violent schools.78  So, while
the claim’s personal nature surely matters, it is difficult to understand
the lack of voice opportunities using that metric alone.79  Something
more must be afoot.
Analyzing the underlying right at stake and categorizing it along a
spectrum that ranges from individually held rights to group rights can
help to both explain and organize corresponding participation expec-
tations in aggregate litigation.  When plaintiffs suffer individual inju-
ries at the same defendant’s hands and unite their claims for economic
or efficiency reasons, joinder itself neither converts their injuries into
an aggregate harm nor automatically diminishes their initial day-in-
court expectations.80  Consequently, plaintiffs with hip injuries are
likely to feel frustrated by inadequate participation opportunities in
multidistrict litigation.  Conversely, when the underlying right arises
from an aggregate harm that affects a group equally and collectively
and demands an indivisible remedy, such as declaratory or injunctive
relief, litigants might tolerate less participation if they closely identify
with the group’s representatives or participate in decision making at
the organizational level.81
77. TYLER, supra note 43, at 143; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass R
Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 11 (2009); Bruce Dyer, Determining the Content of
Procedural Fairness, 19 MONASH U. L. REV. 165, 170 (1993); Macdonald, supra note 43, at 33 R
(“[P]rocedural fairness requires more than positivistic adherence to a finite set of pre-existing
rules . . . .”).
78. See generally Crowley, supra note 25, at 666–74 (arguing that the divergent interests in R
Title VII cases cause inadequate representation).
79. See Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 234–35 (1992) (“The impact of preclusion on public respect for the judiciary
should depend on the type of case in which the doctrine is invoked, the way the doctrine oper-
ates (whether it preludes single issues or entire claims), and the reasons given for preclusion.
After all, individuals are precluded today without participating, and have been in the past, even
as to matters about which they care deeply.”).
80. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Group Consensus, Individual Consent, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 506, 519–25 (2011) (discussing the associative obligations of solidarity or loyalty
among plaintiffs who alleged that the defendant caused them similar harm).
81. This divide aligns with psychological distinctions.  As Tom Tyler writes:
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL206.txt unknown Seq: 17  2-AUG-16 10:13
2016] CALIBRATING PARTICIPATION 339

























 Varies  Varies based on 
group dynamics  
 Low day-in-
court ideals 










































As one might guess, however, allocating participation opportunities
based on sorting rights into two black-or-white, individual-versus-ag-
gregate categories is artificial at best.  Categories can bleed together.
Thus, identifying the underlying right at stake is but a starting point.
One must then consider other factors, such as group cohesion and or-
ganization.  Although litigants’ substantive rights—individual or ag-
gregate—are fixed, their expectations may vary.
For example, tight-knit groups that predate lawsuits over individual
rights may affect participation needs and even allocation decisions.
A central distinction made in the social psychological literature is between depriva-
tions that people understand to have occurred at the individual level (e.g., “I get less
than I should”) and the group level (e.g., “my group gets less than it should”).  This
framing issue is important because it shapes whether people respond to an injustice as
individuals or as a group.  In particular, the group-level framing of injustice may lead to
people taking group-based or collective action, which has been defined as acts in which
people serve as representatives of a group to which they belong when the action is
directed at improving the conditions of the group as a whole.
Tyler, supra note 4, at 732 (footnotes omitted). R
82. An earlier version of this table appeared in Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Adequately
Representing Groups, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3043, 3053 tbl.1 (2013).
83. A corporation is treated as a legal entity distinct from its individual members. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 59 (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (“Except as stated in this
Section, a judgment in an action to which a corporation is a party has no preclusive effects on a
person who is an officer, director, stockholder, or member of a non-stock corporation . . . .”).
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As I have explored in-depth elsewhere,84 group governance might
provide individuals with voice opportunities outside of the court such
that the group can speak collectively in the litigation context.  For in-
stance, in the Stringfellow Acid Pits toxic-tort litigation, a single
group—the Concerned Neighbors in Action—formed out of other
community organizations and created a charter that governed mem-
bers’ litigation and settlement activities.85  Other examples of groups
involved in litigating individual harms abound: labor unions in the as-
bestos litigation, support groups in the tainted blood products86 and
breast implant cases, veterans’ groups in the Agent Orange litigation,
and citizens’ committees in the Buffalo Creek.87
When individual rights are at stake and the system procedurally ag-
gregates those claims, groups might also form after the decision to
sue.88  Both Vioxx and breast implant plaintiffs created support net-
works that facilitated information sharing and networking.89  So, if the
system and the lawyers encouraged litigants to communicate with one
another, they might ultimately decide to collaborate and speak with
one voice on key issues, like settlement.  Collaboration might lead to
plaintiff delegates who, alongside attorneys on a plaintiffs’ steering
committee, present stakeholders’ interests during plaintiffs’ consor-
tium meetings and ensure that the attorneys periodically update the
group on significant developments.90  Those extra judicial voice op-
portunities could restore some measure of participation and control to
plaintiffs swept up in multidistrict litigation.91
84. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations, 91
B.U. L. REV. 87, 147–49 (2011).
85. Jack Hitt, Toxic Dreams: A California Town Finds Meaning in an Acid Pit, HARPER’S
MAG., July 1995, at 57–58, 62.  The plaintiffs even developed constitutional procedures for ap-
proving a settlement offer, which included using a separate judge to decide whether the offer
was fair. Id.
86. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR
PRIVATE GAIN 298 (2000) (describing the hemophiliac community’s HIV litigation).
87. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1, 21–23
(2009) (“[D]istinguishing how class litigation fits into the bigger picture.”).
88. I’ve written about this possibility in-depth elsewhere. See Burch, supra note 77, at 12; See R
Burch, supra note 84, at 132–34; Burch, supra note 87, at 21–22. R
89. Burch, supra note 87, at 22–23; HENSLER, supra note 86, at 1626 n.210; Byron G. Stier, R
Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Network, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 863,
919–21.
90. Burch, supra note 84, at 132–34. R
91. Id.; Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternative Dispute Resolution: A
Closer, Modern Look at an Old Idea, 10 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 211, 243 (2004) (noting that
litigants prefer either well-established court rules or ex ante agreed on procedures); see also
Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1221–25 (1982)
(discussing the judicial strategies employed to alleviate conflicts arising in class member
representation).
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While underlying substantive rights remain static, cohesion among
litigants does not; group unity is flexible.  Although group cohesion
can vary, definitions tend to center around commitment, consensus,
attraction among group members, connectedness, working toward a
common goal, unity of purpose, and placing significance in common
norms.92  Highly cohesive groups are likely to have: (1) members who
share physical and social immediacy; (2) homogeneity through shared
experiences, organizations, or historic events; and (3) overlap in goals,
values, and intentions.93 Procedural justice studies have increasingly
demonstrated noninstrumental effects (concerns that go beyond self-
interest in influencing an outcome) based on group identification,
even when the common circumstance was minimal.94
This means that when the substantive right arises from an aggregate
harm—a harm that affects a group of people equally and collec-
tively—and demands an indivisible remedy such as declaratory or in-
junctive relief, litigants might tolerate less participation if they closely
identify with the represented group.95  Aggregate harms affect a group
qua group; think of housing and school desegregation cases, or Title
VII employment discrimination class actions seeking to enjoin dis-
criminatory behavior, for example.  Suits like these seek indivisible
remedies—such as integration or the cessation of discriminatory prac-
tices—relief that yields a uniform result regardless of whether a single
individual or an entire group sues.96  Moreover, proving liability re-
quires the judge to examine how the employer, housing authority, or
school system treated a group of people in comparison to others
outside the group.  In that sense, the litigation operates to group
members’ benefit or detriment equally.  So, if group members identify
with those litigating on their behalf, they may feel more comfortable
with diminished individual participation.97
92. See generally Albert A. Cota et al., The Structure of Group Cohesion, 21 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 572, 574–77 (1995) (discussing and studying group cohesion).
93. R. Scott Tindale et al., Shared Cognition in Small Groups, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK ON
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP PROCESSES 1, 5 (Michael A. Hoagg & R. Scott Tindale eds., 2001).
94. LIND & TYLER, supra note 32, at 230–31.
95. Professor Patrick Woolley has argued, in contrast, that structural reform suits are individ-
ual rights because they are often premised on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantee rights to individuals.  Woolley, supra note 51, at R
587–89.
96. John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1433
(2003). See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04(b) (AM. LAW
INST. 2010) (“Indivisible remedies are those such that the distribution of relief to any claimant as
a practical matter determines the application or availability of the same remedy to other
claimants.”).
97. See infra Part III.B (proposing readjustments based on group dynamics in mandatory and
issue classes).
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In short, groups can alter litigants’ day-in-court expectations, partic-
ularly when they are cohesive and well organized.  When members are
united in their shared litigation plans and objectives, their representa-
tive’s voice may be all that’s needed.98  Likewise, if the group is highly
organized such that it maintains its own governance structure (e.g.,
unions), the extra-judicial participation may substitute for court-based
participation.  Even though these variables can affect participation ex-
pectations in predicable ways, they are neither transparent nor pre-
dictable to judges because judges cannot always identify which groups
are united and which are divided.
Accordingly, collateral attacks based on inadequate representation
may act as a mild failsafe for instrumental and dignitary participation
concerns.99  When a class action purports to extinguish individual
rights, courts should allow plaintiffs to relitigate their claims if the first
court failed to identify and correct “structural conflicts” between the
claimants themselves or between the representatives and the claim-
ants.100  Individual harms do not morph into aggregate harms simply
because courts treat them collectively through multidistrict litigation
or even Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.  And though participation expec-
tations may fluctuate if litigants identify with and consent to group
governance, one’s right to conflict-free representation does not suc-
cumb to group will.
Conversely, if the class action purports to terminate aggregate
rights that demand a single, indivisible remedy, courts should tolerate
greater conflicts and permit collateral attack only when the represent-
atives acted contrary to the group’s best interests or tried to represent
an overinclusive group in which some members would require a rem-
edy that the representative had no selfish reason to pursue.101  When
the underlying right is inherently aggregate, like litigation setting pub-
98. See generally Burch, supra note 87, at 22–31 (discussing the moral and political psychology R
as well as social psychology in analyzing group dynamics within nonclass aggregation).
99. See infra Part III.B.2 (suggesting that providing routine notice to litigants involved in
mandatory class actions, would enable those who are dissatisfied with the group process to inter-
vene under Rule 24 or object to the settlement under Rule 23(e)).
100. See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a) (listing the
rules on individual rights in aggregate claims).  That is, a conflict of interest either between the
claimants and the lawyers who would represent claimants on an aggregate basis, . . . or
. . . among the claimants themselves that would present a significant risk that the law-
yers for claimants might skew systematically the conduct of the litigation so as to favor
some claimants over others on grounds aside from reasoned evaluation of their respec-
tive claims or to disfavor claimants generally vis-a`-vis the lawyers themselves.
Id.
101. Id. at 3061.
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lic-transit fares102 or implementing a federal wildlife-management
statute,103 citizens are bound by the result not because they had ade-
quate participation opportunities or even perfectly aligned interests,
but because remedying an aggregate right demands an aggregate rem-
edy.104  Because every member receives the same indivisible remedy,
if one member is inadequately represented then they all are.  But, if
the group representative tried to shoehorn individual, divisible relief
into a mandatory class, for example, then the previous suit should not
bind the class member.105  Allowing a member to resurrect her sub-
stantive and participation rights under those circumstances would alle-
viate dignitary concerns and may well improve the outcome’s accuracy
because her eligibility to relief, particularly divisible relief, may de-
pend on information that only she possesses.
In sum, considering substantive rights alongside malleable group
dynamics is a useful heuristic for thinking through a smattering of re-
lationships between participation, adequate representation, and join-
der. This Section’s framework linked participation rights to fixed
substantive rights but layered in flexible expectations based on group
cohesion and organization.  As such, it reflected procedure’s funda-
mental interpersonal character as governing social interaction be-
tween citizens and the courts106 and incorporated recent research on
the group engagement model when group identity played a primary
role in assessing procedural justice.107
B. Examining and Recalibrating Participation
Linking critical procedural rights like adequate representation and
the right to participate in the proceedings to the underlying substan-
102. See, e.g., Berman v. Denver Tramway Corp., 197 F.2d 946 (10th Cir. 1952).
103. Alaska Legis. Council v. Babbitt, 15 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 1998), aff’d, 181 F.3d 1333
(D.C. Cir. 1999).
104. Burch, supra note 82, at 3052. R
105. Id. at 3058–61; see, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011)
(noting that class representatives might have perverse incentives to risk potentially valid claims
for divisible relief if they were permitted to drop those claims in hopes of certifying a Rule
23(b)(2) class); Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992) (allowing a party
to collaterally attack a previous, mandatory class action that extinguished his right to pursue
divisible remedies).
106. See generally Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, The Group Engagement Model: Procedu-
ral Justice, Social Identity, and Cooperative Behavior, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV.
349, 350 (2003) (redefining procedural justice).
107. See generally id. at 352 (describing the group engagement model). “[W]ithin the study of
procedural justice, research has shifted from exclusively defining procedural fairness by the qual-
ity of decision-making procedures to broader definitions of procedural fairness that also consider
the quality of people’s interpersonal treatment when they are interacting with others.” Id. at
357.
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tive right at stake has important implications for how courts should
treat individuals in issue-class actions and mandatory classes.108  These
areas expose opportunities, nuances, and the need for certain changes
to support oscillating participation levels based on group dynamics.
1. Tailoring Participation in Issue Classes
To illustrate, let’s consider a straightforward example such that we
can then build in layers of complexity to demonstrate how the system
might tailor participation opportunities to coincide with remedial re-
lief and policy goals.  Imagine that Defendant owns a factory and
plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s storage tank leaked the chemical Tri-
chloroethylene (TCE) into the soil and groundwater around their
homes.  The leak affects approximately 1,000 would-be class members
who live within a mile or two of the factory.  Plaintiffs sue on several
theories, including: the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA);109 the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA);110 and nuisance.
Additionally plaintiffs request indivisible injunctive relief requiring
Defendant to remediate the contaminated area.111
If each plaintiff sued individually, in theory, each would have her
day in court, but courts would hear repetitive evidence about Defen-
dant’s conduct and could reach inconsistent verdicts as to Defendant’s
cleanup responsibilities.  Neither dignitary nor instrumental procedu-
ral justice concerns dictate that individual participation is necessary;
representative litigation under Rule 23(b)(2) should suffice.  When
plaintiffs request only declaratory or injunctive relief relating to De-
108. This discussion has some bearing on parens patriae suits that litigate quasi-sovereign in-
terests.  Although the state’s interest must be distinct from individual citizens’ interests, the Su-
preme Court has been enigmatic in defining the parameters of “quasi-sovereign” interests,
leaving creative attorneys general to depart from well-traveled paths like environmental and
antitrust issues. See generally Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600
(1982) (defining parens patriae).  As one commentator observed: “‘Quasi-sovereign’ is one of
those loopy concepts that comes along often enough to remind us that appellate courts some-
times lose their moorings and drift off into the ether.  It is a meaningless term absolutely bereft
of utility.”  Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847, 1851 (2000).
109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75 (2012).
110. Id. §§ 6901–92 (2012).
111. These basic facts are taken from Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Systems Corp., 319 F.3d 910 (7th
Cir. 2003).  Nevertheless, I have manipulated them to make certain points about indivisible and
divisible relief that do not always mesh with environmental laws.  For example, private parties
must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing toxic-tort claims in court: before suing
under CERCLA, private parties must provide notice to the Environmental Protection Agency
administrator, the state, and the defendant sixty days before suing.  Plaintiffs may file suit only if
the government decides not to sue.  42 U.S.C. §§ 9659(a), (d)–(e). The same is true for claims
under the RCRA. Id. at §§ 6972(b)(2)(A)–(B).
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fendant’s conduct, all plaintiffs are united in their shared goal to es-
tablish Defendant’s remediation obligations.112  They can, in other
words, speak with one voice on that issue.  Plus, cleaning up the spill
on a property-by-property basis wouldn’t do much good; contami-
nated areas would continue to leach into the soil and repollute
remediated land.113  As to instrumental accuracy concerns, if individu-
als possessed unique information pertaining to Defendant’s conduct,
class-wide discovery would mine that knowledge, prevent information
asymmetries among plaintiffs, and allow each plaintiff to benefit from
those details equally.
This reasoning extends one step further to certifying issue classes
that pertain to Defendant’s conduct elements.  As I have elaborated
elsewhere,114 “conduct components” concern a defendant’s behavior:
whether Defendant released TCE into the ground, when Defendant
knew contaminants were being released, and whether Defendant fully
defined the contamination’s extent or impact under state remediation
programs.115  When a defendant’s actions are uniform and nonindivid-
uated,116 conduct components are common to all people affected by
those actions and are, thus, theoretically ripe for aggregate treatment
and diminished participation.117  From an instrumental perspective,
112. See Burch, supra note 87, at 26–27 (suggesting that people within groups may use reason- R
ing and bargaining to pressure one another to agree about how to accomplish their shared end).
113. The public nuisance doctrine reflects this practicality.  It suggests that public officials or
class representatives are the only ones who have standing to enjoin a public nuisance unless the
private party has suffered a different kind of harm than other members of the public.  4 RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
114. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Constructing Issue Classes, 101 VA. L. REV. 1855, 1875–76
(2015).
115. See, e.g., Amended Class Action Complaint for Injunctive, Declaratory & Other Relief at
2–3, Mejdrech v. Lockformer Co., No. 01 C 6107, 2003 WL 22078392 (N.D. Sept. 5, 2003), 2001
WL 34554328.
116. Contrast, for example, the Rustein and Avis cases. See infra notes 124–27.
117. See, e.g., In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 804, 815–16 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he
district court set forth a considerable list of issues that were common to all the class members’
claims.  Nearly all of these issues related to either the complicated factual questions surrounding
BP’s involvement in the well design, explosion, discharge of oil, and cleanup efforts” and that
those issues were certifiable “despite the particular need in such cases for individualized dam-
ages calculations.”); In re IKO Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 757 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir.
2014) (noting that liability issues related to defendant’s conduct were “suited to class-wide reso-
lution”); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 166 (2d Cir. 1987) (upholding
certification based on defendant’s military-contractor defense); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc.,
109 F.R.D. 269, 279–80 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (certifying a class action based on defendant’s state-of-
the-art defense). In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices &
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 8:10ML2151JVS (FMOx), 2012 WL 7802852, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28,
2012) (“The class members’ claims all arise from allegations regarding a common defect.  Moreo-
ver, the class members’ claims derive from similar or identical warranties and are based on com-
mon advertisements and representations regarding their vehicles.”); In re Vitamins Antitrust
Litig., 209 F.R.D. 251, 262 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[A]s to the vitamin product class, plaintiffs have
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adding or subtracting a particular plaintiff when adjudicating a defen-
dant’s behavior should have no effect on accuracy because conduct
elements are distinct from plaintiffs’ eligibility for relief.118  Likewise,
from a dignitary perspective, as long as the evidence of a defendant’s
conduct isn’t unduly constrained by presenting it separately from evi-
dence that concerns a specific plaintiff’s eligibility for relief,119 speak-
ing with one voice on conduct issues increases the likelihood that
plaintiffs will be fully heard: issue classes level resource and informa-
tional asymmetries that typically favor defendants.120  And, after uni-
form adjudication on conduct issues, plaintiffs would then have the
burden of proving—and the opportunity to participate in—their indi-
vidual entitlement to relief.
So, returning to the toxic tort example, if the plaintiffs requested
not just indivisible relief as to Defendant’s cleanup obligations, but
also compensatory damages for their diminished property value, lay-
ering divisible relief atop indivisible relief need not change participa-
tion constructs as to the indivisible relief.  Plaintiffs are still united in
their commitment to establish Defendant’s uniform conduct.  But they
might splinter over what weight or significance to afford to subse-
quent questions of entitlement or allocation.  Those concerns translate
into collective, issue-class procedures: as the Seventh Circuit recog-
nized in Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Systems Corp.,121 it makes sense to liti-
gate “the core questions, i.e., whether or not and to what extent [Met-
Coil] caused contamination of the area in question”  “in one fell
swoop while leaving the remaining, claimant-specific issues to individ-
alleged that defendants have participated in a unitary overarching conspiracy which encom-
passed a number of identified vitamins.”).
118. Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1255 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[I]f common issues truly
predominate over individualized issues in a lawsuit, then ‘the addition or subtraction of any of
the plaintiffs to or from the class [should not] have a substantial effect on the substance or
quantity of evidence offered.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Alabama v. Blue Bird
Body Co., 573 F.2d 309, 322 (5th Cir. 1978), abbrogated by Bridge v. PHX Bond & Indem. Co.,
553 U.S. 639 (2008)); see Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911 (7th Cir. 2003) (“If
there are genuinely common issues, issues identical across all the claimants, issues moreover the
accuracy of the resolution of which is unlikely to be enhanced by repeated proceedings, then it
makes good sense, especially when the class is large, to resolve those issue in one fell swoop
while leaving the remaining, claimant-specific issue to individual follow-on proceedings.”).
119. For example, in an issue-class trial on whether a defendant defectively designed a prod-
uct, exemplar plaintiffs might need to testify as to the product’s risks and benefits.  Eligibility
elements in the toxic tort example provided in text supra would include specific causation, such
as evidence that Defendant’s contamination leaked onto a particular plaintiff’s property and
caused harm there (such as decreased property value or personal injuries).  See Burch, supra
note 114, at 1874–81, for more on eligibility versus conduct elements. R
120. Id. at 52.
121. 319 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2003).
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ual follow-on proceedings.”122  In these later proceedings, individuals
could participate in and present unique evidence demonstrating the
fact and extent of their individual injuries, such as a home within the
affected area and any evidence of particular personal harm they
suffered.
These circumstances must, however, be carefully distinguished from
those in which the full scope of a defendant’s conduct comes into fo-
cus only by taking a bird’s eye view of multiple plaintiffs’ claims.  In
that case, proof is not aggregate proof that applies to each plaintiff’s
claim equally as in the toxic tort example but, rather, evidence built
from a series of individual circumstances.  Procedurally, these types of
cases tend not to proceed as Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, but through
joining individual plaintiffs under Rule 20.123
When liability necessitates proving an array of individual incidents,
such as some pattern-or-practice type cases, then voice, participation,
and the ability to present individual evidence are each critical to pro-
ducing accurate outcomes and honoring plaintiffs’ dignitary interests.
Put differently, forcing would-be plaintiffs into mandatory joinder
through a (b)(2) class (in which they are often not notified about the
suit until settlement) would affect the quality and nature of the evi-
dence as well as the legitimacy of the outcome.  Accordingly, courts
have justifiably denied class treatment in cases like Rutstein v. Avis
Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc.,124 in which plaintiffs would have to demon-
strate the individualized circumstances of why they were each denied
car rentals to show religious animus on Avis’s part,125 and Jackson v.
Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc.,126 in which each plaintiff would have to
prove why they were denied accommodations or given dirty hotel
rooms to show racial discrimination.127
Putting those circumstances aside, when courts can isolate a defen-
dant’s uniform conduct for issue-class treatment, it may make sense to
certify those proceedings as a mandatory issue class.  Returning to the
toxic tort example, either Defendant contaminated the area or it
122. Id. at 911 (alteration in original).
123. They might likewise fit within Rule 23(b)(3) if they meet Rule 23(a)’s commonality re-
quirement and common questions predominate over individual ones.
124. 211 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2000).
125. Id. at 1235 (denying class certification because “[e]ach plaintiff [would] have to bring
forth evidence demonstrating that the defendant had an intent to treat him or her less favorably
because of the plaintiff’s Jewish ethnicity”).
126. 130 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 1997).
127. Id. at 1006 (denying class certification because plaintiffs’ proof would have “require[d]
distinctly case-specific inquiries into the facts surrounding each alleged incident of
discrimination”).
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didn’t.  And while one jury or judge might reach the wrong outcome
on that question, providing an interlocutory appeal on the merits
serves other procedural justice goals, like correcting error and allevi-
ating any undue settlement pressure.128
2. Improving Participation in Mandatory Classes
As Part III.A illustrated, ensuring adequate participation in
mandatory class actions can prove challenging for several reasons: (1)
Rule 23(b)(2) requires no notice until parties propose a settlement
and none at all if the class is fully litigated; (2) ameliorating harm de-
mands an indivisible remedy that applies to the whole group; and (3)
the underlying substantive rights are not always purely aggregate.129
For instance, some have argued that structural reform suits, which in-
variably demand indivisible remedies, rest on rights that the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
guarantee to individuals, not groups.130  And even when a right plainly
belongs to a group, group members may be only loosely affiliated.
They may thus have vastly conflicting opinions about legal theories,
presenting evidence, and shaping the aggregate remedial relief yet re-
ceive no notice.131  That result is troubling from both the instrumental
and noninstrumental perspective.132
To illustrate these concerns, consider an example.  In Waters v.
Barry,133 the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) challenged an
11:00 PM curfew that ordered all minors in the District of Columbia to
be inside after that time; yet, many of the class members and their
parents preferred to trade their First Amendment rights for public
safety.134  Those conflicting interests, however, did not prevent the
court from certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) non-opt-out class.  While one
128. See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.09 cmt. b. (AM. LAW
INST. 2010) (discussing the availability of an interlocutory appeal as a means to determine a
common issue on the merits).  See Burch, supra note 114, for a more in-depth discussion of these R
issues. This mandatory issue-class approach likewise complies with the recent Supreme Court
requirements in Dukes that “a classwide proceeding generate common answers apt to drive the
resolution of the litigation” and that courts should not include individualized relief within a
mandatory class.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (quoting Richard
A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132
(2009)).
129. See supra Burch, supra note 82, at 3053 tbl.1. R
130. See, e.g., Woolley, supra note 51, at 586–89. R
131. Rule 23(c)(2) allows, but does not require, notice in mandatory actions, although the
“court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound” by
a proposed settlement under Rule 23(e)(1).
132. It is likewise troubling from a due process perspective. See Burch, supra note 82, at 3048. R
133. 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989).
134. Id. at 1131–32.
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might rationalize that having adequate and typical representatives
would be all that the instrumental view requires, input from group
members might affect which theories of liability to pursue or which
evidence to emphasize, both of which could affect the outcome.  And
in Waters, members’ involvement could have shaped remedial relief in
a way that addressed both public safety concerns and First Amend-
ment rights.  Because class members were not ACLU members, al-
lowing them to participate in the proceedings or in open meetings
could satisfy their dignitary needs.135
When loose-knit groups face litigation that entails only one uniform
remedy that affects members equally, one possible fix is to encourage
judges to notify class members when they certify a (b)(2) class as they
do in (b)(3) classes.136  Notifying members before settlement could
provide interested members with an informal group-based forum for
participating by weighing in on key litigation decisions and remedial
relief.137  Group-centered participation opportunities can supplement
scant court-based participation, add dignitary value, and enhance the
outcome’s legitimacy even if the controlling representatives do not ul-
timately incorporate members’ divergent views.138
From an instrumental perspective, encouraging notice and group-
based participation when aggregate rights are at stake may improve
accuracy.  Groups of cognitively diverse people can make more accu-
rate predictions, solve problems, improve performance, and aggregate
information.139  Even though litigants with less group solidarity are
135. See Tyler & Blader, supra note 106, at 350–54 . R
136. Rule 23(c)(2)(A) already permits this solution without requiring a rule change.  Addi-
tionally, the subcommittee for Rule 23 recently raised the question of requiring notice in
mandatory actions given the low cost and widespread availability of electronic means. ADVI-
SORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 285–86 (Apr. 9–10, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/17943/
download.  Using electronic means to communicate with class members in mandatory classes
could facilitate participation without proving cost-prohibitive for public interest groups that
often initiate these cases.
137. See, e.g., Williams v. Lane, 96 F.R.D. 383, 386 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (“More important, this
Court can afford class members the opportunity to comment on the issue of relief if their views
on this subject are truly discordant.”).
138. LIND & TYLER, supra note 32, 102–03; E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedu- R
ral Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 956–58 (1990) (discussing the results of a study examining the
correlation between voice and perceived control); Linda Musante et al., The Effects of Control
on Perceived Fairness of Procedures and Outcomes, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 223,
237–38 (1983).
139. SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER
GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 137–44 (2007); see also HOWARD RHEINGOLD,
SMART MOBS: THE NEXT SOCIAL REVOLUTION, at xviii, 164, 182 (2002) (discussing how techno-
logical advances allow people to work together for the better in some situations); JAMES
SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 29–31 (2004).
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likely to disagree more, conflict and dissonance are actually beneficial;
they encourage novel solutions, diverse ideas, and creative problem
solving.140  Forcing representatives to first defend their position within
the group context can foster persuasive advocacy and well-developed
arguments in addition to increasing the likelihood that dissenters will
be more willing to accept the court’s ultimate decision.141  Although
dissenters would still be bound by the litigation’s outcome because the
remedy must inure to all or to none, if their position does not gain
traction within the group setting, they might object under Rule
23(e)(5) or intervene under Rule 24 and state their position to the
judge.142
IV. CURTAILING PARTICIPATION THROUGH
PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING
Reflecting on recent Supreme Court jurisprudence thus far suggests
that the Court has taken measures to protect an individual’s right to
her day in court against encroachment by external parties who seek to
extinguish those participation opportunities without sufficient safe-
guards. Taylor and Bayer each support this notion.143  What the
Court seems to have missed, however, is that pleading is participating.
The complaint is a plaintiff’s first opportunity to voice her concerns to
the court and state a claim that entitles her to relief.  Curtailing that
right closes the courthouse door and forecloses further participation
opportunities.
There is thus a glaring disconnect in the Supreme Court’s decisions.
In 2008, a unanimous Court decided Taylor, and, in 2011, a nearly
unanimous Court decided Bayer.144  But shortly before Taylor, in
2007, the Court instituted plausibility pleading in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly.145  And right after Taylor, in 2009, the Court ensured that
lower courts applied its new heightened standard universally with its
140. Lisa Troyer & Reef Youngreen, Conflict and Creativity in Groups, 65 J. SOC. ISSUES 409,
413 (2009).
141. See W. RUSSELL NEUMAN, THE PARADOX OF MASS POLITICS: KNOWLEDGE AND OPIN-
ION IN THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE 126–27 (1986) (discussing the three effects of group partici-
pation in politics); Rhode, supra note 91, at 1223–24. R
142. Intervention would need to be timely.  See Woolley, supra note 51, at 590–93, for a full R
discussion of this intervention proposal.
143. See supra notes 58–68 and accompanying text.  One might even read Wal-Mart, along the R
same lines.  There, the Court required sufficient commonality to glue the class together and
refused to allow backpay (a divisible remedy) to be included within a mandatory class, which
protects absent class members’ individual rights to divisible relief from terminating without the
chance to opt out. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 (2001).
144. Justice Thomas joined in only part of the majority’s opinion.
145. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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opinion in Ascroft v. Iqbal.146 Although both Twombly and Iqbal in-
cited dissent,147 the Court’s majority overlooked the obvious tension:
guaranteeing a universal right to one’s day in court is a thin right in-
deed if it applies only to those who already have all of the information
they need.  Pleading unlocks discovery, and the purpose of discovery
is to facilitate the exchange of information, especially information
known to only one party.
So, the universal right to one’s day in court, to participate in one’s
lawsuit, is not so universal after all.  What could possibly explain this
change?  The Twombly majority cited concern over cost and delay.148
For decades, however, procedural justice studies have suggested
that cost and delay do not play a significant role in litigants’ opinions
of procedural fairness.149  Granted, most studies are conducted on in-
dividuals, not corporations,150 but individual litigants’ perception of
cost was unrelated to judgments of fairness or system satisfaction.151
When researchers tested the effects of defendants paying their own
costs versus defendants with fees paid by insurance companies, they
still found no relationship between procedural fairness judgments and
cost discrepancies.152  In short, within the realm of traditional tort liti-
gation, cost and delay did not greatly impact litigants’ procedural jus-
tice evaluations.153  These generalized findings suggest that efforts to
reduce cost and delay should not be shouldered at the expense of
voice, dignity, and impartiality in decision making.154
146. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942–43 (2008).
147. Twombly prompted dissent from Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, and the dissenters in
Iqbal swelled to include Justices Souter (who authored the Twombly opinion) and Breyer.
148. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59.
149. See, e.g., LIND ET AL., supra note 2, at 55–56 (“The absence of any correlation at all R
between delay and satisfaction or perceived fairness is especially striking in light of the frequent
assertion that litigants are dissatisfied with the civil justice system because of the delays they
encounter.  Delay appears not to play a substantial role in determining whether tort procedures
are seen as fair and whether the litigant leaves the court satisfied. . . .  As was the case with the
results of the analyses of case delay, the absence of any real relationship between litigation cost
and perceived fairness or satisfaction is an unexpected and especially noteworthy finding.”).
150. Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 38, at 149 (suggesting that “procedural justice effects are R
likely to be more profound” for individuals and “may be particularly critical in counteracting
negative impressions of resource-based rather than merit-based decisions and of bias toward
corporate parties”).
151. See, e.g., LIND ET AL., supra note 2, at 56. R
152. Id. at 57. But see E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evalua-
tions of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953, 984 (1990)
(suggesting that there is a relationship between perceived fairness and whether the cost was
more or less than expected).
153. LIND ET AL., supra note 2, at 77; Lind et al., supra note 152, at 984 (noting that subjective R
measures of outcome and cost were based on whether a litigant had modest expectations and
understood the economic realities of litigation).
154. LIND ET AL., supra note 2, at 78. R
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Nevertheless, for as long as procedural justice research has sug-
gested that cost and delay are not significant factors for litigants, those
factors have served as stalking horses for various interests and reforms
on both sides of the aisle.155  Despite empirical evidence suggesting
that these factors are neither integral to public perceptions of proce-
dural justice nor actually problematic,156 defendants’ recent com-
plaints about meritless claims and burgeoning discovery costs did not
fall on deaf ears.157  Quite the contrary: Twombly158 and Iqbal159 re-
interpreted Rule 8(a)(2)’s “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”160 as requiring claimants
to establish their complaint’s plausibility as to liability on the merits
without using conclusory legal allegations.  This change threatens pro-
cedural justice tenets in at least three ways.
First, the reinterpretation itself—accomplished by judicial fiat
rather than the transparent, democratic rulemaking process—strained
the legitimacy of the new gloss on Rule 8.161  Unlike Supreme Court
opinions, the seven-step rulemaking process includes multiple layers
that insulate and legitimize it, including a public notice-and-comment
period, Supreme Court approval, and congressional review.162  To be
155. See, e.g., AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS ON DISCOVERY & THE INST. FOR THE ADVANCE-
MENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT 2 (2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/document/
final-report-actl-iaals-joint-project (claiming that the justice system “is in serious need of repair”
because it “takes too long and costs too much” and that the rise of “alternative dispute resolu-
tion emphasizes [those] point[s]”); John S. Palmore, The Urgency of Economic Litigation, 67
A.B.A. J. 814 (1981) (suggesting that reducing litigation costs can fix problems with access to
legal services and curb the trend toward alternative dispute resolution).
156. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT: FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA xxvii (1998) (e-book), http://www.rand.org/
pubs/monograph_reports/2009/MR941.pdf; Reda, supra note 6, at 1115–16. R
157. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (noting concerns over groundless
claims and discovery costs); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558–59 (2007).
158. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
159. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 667–68.
160. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
161. E.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95
IOWA L. REV. 821, 850 (2010) (“[B]efore discarding the pleading system that has been in place
for many years, we ought to discuss its virtues and failures soberly and with the relevant informa-
tion before us.  The rulemaking bodies should have hosted that discussion. Twombly and Iqbal
short-circuited any such discussion.”); Miller, supra note 3, at 333–34 (2013); Steve Subrin, Ash- R
croft v. Iqbal: Contempt for Rules, Statutes, the Constitution, and Elemental Fairness, 12 NEV. L.
REV. 571, 575 (2012); Hearing on Whether the Supreme Court Has Limited Americans’ Access to
Court Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (Dec. 2, 2009) (statement of Professor
Stephen B. Burbank), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12-02-09%20Burbank%
Testimony.pdf.
162. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2073, 2077 (2012).  Granted, some have criticized the rulemaking pro-
cess as losing credibility too. E.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Infor-
mal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 798–99 (1991).
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sure, the Supreme Court itself enjoys a great deal of legitimacy,163 but
that support rests on the principle of neutrality.164  As the Court has
noted in previous controversial decisions, firmly adhering to prece-
dent suggests that decision making and discretion is neither arbitrary
nor subjective.165  More to the point, procedural justice research ties
neutrality to judgments based on solid information (as opposed to
personal opinions).166  But, in Twombly and Iqbal, the Court disre-
garded both precedent and available empirical data on discovery
costs.
Before the Court invented plausibility pleading, plaintiffs had to
give defendants “fair notice of the grounds for entitlement to relief”
and, for fifty years, “the accepted rule” under Conley v. Gibson167 was
that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”168  Sev-
eral times thereafter, the Court overturned and chastised lower courts
for deviating from Conley and imposing heightened pleading stan-
dards.169  More stringent pleading standards, the Supreme Court ex-
plained, “must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal
Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”170  Yet, Twombly did just
that.  It dubbed Conley’s language as “best forgotten as an incom-
163. E.g., THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 138–41 (1989)
(citing polls indicating greater support for courts than the executive or legislative branches);
James L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Po-
litical Tolerance, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 469, 470 (1989).
164. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discre-
tionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J.
703, 713 (1994) (“The data analyzed support the argument made by the Justices in [Planned
Parenthood v. Casey] (as well as by legal scholars such as Fiss) that perceptions of political
neutrality bear an important relationship to Court legitimacy.”)
165. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“[T]he very concept of
the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect
for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”); Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 164, at 709 (“Ad- R
herence to precedent provides one method for appearing principled and thus for maintaining
legitimacy and obedience.”).
166. Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 164, at 776 (“[N]eutrality effects are primarily related to R
judgments about honesty and about whether information (not personal opinion) is used to make
decisions.”).
167. 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
168. Id. at 45–46. But see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561 (recognizing Conley as the accepted rule
but calling for a less literal reading).
169. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 168 (1993); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512–13 (2002) (citing
Leatherman favorably to undercut heightened pleading standards in the employment discrimina-
tion context).
170. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
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plete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard.”171  Ignoring
standard rules practice and contrary precedent when combined with
the slipperiness of Twombly’s new standard leads to a multiplicative
concern:  as Professor Arthur Miller expressed, “the motion to dismiss
may well morph into a trial-type inquiry with the capability of termi-
nating a case at its outset based on little more than judicial intuition
and a personal sense of what in the complaint seems convincing and
what does not.”172
In deciding Twombly and Iqbal, the Court not only rebuffed prece-
dent,173 it also announced a new standard without considering infor-
mation on the true costs of discovery.  Had the change worked
through normal rulemaking channels, the Supreme Court could have
considered empirical data on discovery costs.  As the Federal Judicial
Center revealed in its 2009 study, the median cost to defendants of
both discovery and attorneys’ fees was only $20,000 per case, and
those expenses cost plaintiffs $15,000.174  To put these numbers in per-
spective, they constitute 3.3% of the reported stakes for defendants
and 1.6% for plaintiffs, numbers that are not disproportionate or wor-
risome.175  Moreover, the study is not an anomaly; contrary to persis-
tent anecdotes, these numbers are in line with decades of empirical
work that reached similar conclusions.176
Second, there is a lingering question as to what Twombly and Iqbal
actually accomplished.  Plaintiffs are now twice as likely to face
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, and courts are more likely to grant those
motions.177  But those dismissals do not reach the level of statistical
significance.178  By this view, plausibility pleading appears to have ac-
complished little beyond adding cost and delay to civil litigation, lining
lawyers’ pockets through additional billable hours, and taxing the al-
171. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 546; accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 670 (2009) (“Twombly
retired the Conley no-set-of-facts test . . . .”).
172. Miller, supra note 3, at 338. R
173. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 161, at 832 (“The two cases profoundly changed the law R
of pleading by adopting a procedural mechanism without precedent in the law.”).
174. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. NAT’L, CASE-BASED
CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 (2009), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/
dissurv1.pdf.
175. Id.
176. Reda, supra note 6, at 1103–16 (citing numerous studies). R
177. Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial
Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 7 (2012).
178. JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES, at vii, 21 (2011), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/
motioniqbal.pdf.
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ready overburdened judiciary.  And, while cost and delay do not typi-
cally affect litigants’ procedural fairness opinions, they become
significant when the delay is unreasonable.179  As one nonpartisan
study concluded, “[i]f more rapid or less expensive procedures accom-
plish cost and time savings at the expense of apparent dignity, careful-
ness, or lack of bias, they may constitute a poor bargain in the eyes of
litigants.”180
Third, plausibility pleading may raise entry barriers that, at least for
some, may be insurmountable.  Carefully reading the Federal Judicial
Center’s empirical study on dismissals after Iqbal, one scholar has ar-
gued that highlighting only statistically significant results without ex-
plaining what that terminology means can paint an incomplete picture
of pretrial litigation today.181  For example, even though 12(b)(6) dis-
missals in the post-Iqbal period were not statistically significant,
“plaintiffs were twice as likely to face a dismissal motion,” and “a de-
fendant’s chances of winning dismissal after Iqbal were better both
overall and in every case category examined.”182  Moreover, examin-
ing court dockets tells us little about whether the plausibility standard
deters citizens from filing claims or how many plaintiffs with meritori-
ous claims have been filtered out of the system.183
If litigants are deterred from bringing meritorious cases, then there
is more to worry about than added cost and delay; the decisions
threaten the fundamental fabric of Americans’ day-in-court ideal.184
Plaintiffs face inherent information asymmetries in certain types of
cases like products liability and employment discrimination that make
gathering the necessary information to meet Twombly’s plausibility
standard nearly impossible.185  And though procedural justice tenets
dictate that process should allocate the risk of error and the cost of
access as evenly as possible among the parties,186 these pleading deci-
179. LIND ET AL., supra note 2, at 77; Lind et al., supra note 152, at 983–84. R
180. LIND ET AL., supra note 2, at 78. R
181. Hoffman, supra note 177, at 6–7. R
182. Id. at 40.
183. Id. at 32.
184. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (“[It is] our ‘deep-rooted historic
tradition that everyone should have his own day in court. . . .’” (quoting Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755, 762 (1982)); Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 390 (“No principle is more basic to our R
constitutional system than that a person who has been hurt deserves his or her day in court.”).
185. Miller, supra note 3, at 341–46 (providing but one example of a slip-and-fall case alleging R
serious injuries in which the court dismissed the case because the plaintiff failed to allege “what
the substance on the floor was, how it got there, how long it had been there, and whether anyone
else had slipped and fallen”).
186. See, e.g., BAYLES, supra note 46, at 117–20; Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: R
The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 514
(2003) (“In addition to considering the risk of error, a theory of procedural fairness must take
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sions fall disproportionately on plaintiffs.187  That, in turn, undermines
a basic principle on which nearly everyone agrees—that participation
and voice are critical to fair process and voice begins with pleading.188
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, after protecting one’s right to her day in court from the
ever-expanding notions of aggregate litigation, the Supreme Court
then stymies plaintiffs from exercising that right in a broad array of
cases in which information lies beyond their grasp.  As of the last
count, over one-half of the states embraced some version of plausibil-
ity pleading as well.189  Combining this with trends toward arbitration
and away from trials leaves one wondering what role remains for the
third branch.
In what seems to be a war on litigation, the Court’s cases defending
the right to have one’s day in court against virtual representation and
proposed but never certified classes provide one small ray of hope.
Preventing defendants from extinguishing plaintiffs’ rights to sue with-
out procedural safeguards, adequate representation, or notice at least
permits plaintiffs’ lawyers and public interest groups to continue the
fight.
Two other points of light bear mention.  First, despite tightening
class certification standards, courts are embracing greater use of issue
classes, which can target defendants’ conduct and—heaven forbid—
adjudicate it on the merits.  But this means that courts need to think
carefully about how to frame those issues and ensure appropriate par-
ticipation opportunities for involved plaintiffs.190  Second, the Sub-
committee on Rule 23 appears poised to require early notice to those
with rights affected by mandatory classes.  In its April 2015 report to
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the Subcommittee indicated
a willingness to engage the issue given the low cost and ease of elec-
tronic communication.191  Nevertheless, the overall outlook remains
grim.  Courts’ legitimacy hangs in the balance; recalibration cannot
come soon enough.
account of process costs, including social costs of additional procedure to reduce error, and it
must do so within the framework of the fairness theory itself.”).
187. Solum, supra note 46, at 257–58. R
188. Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 38, at 135–36. “Although requiring plaintiffs to say more R
about . . . facts may look, at first blush, like an opportunity to increase participation, in fact this
requirement dampens participation because it raises the bar to have one’s case heard before the
court at all.” Id. at 153.
189. See Spencer, supra note 29, at 2, 14–16. R
190. See Burch, supra note 114, for more information on how courts might handle issue R
classes.
191. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 136, at 285–86. R
